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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
THE STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff/Respondent 
vs. 
DANNY DUANE BUCK, 
Defendant/Appellant 
Case No. 19772 
BRIEF OF APPELLANT 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
This is an appeal from a judgment against Danny Duane 
Buck for two counts of Unlawful Possession of a Controlled 
Substance with Intent to Distribute for Value in a trial heard 
by the bench. He was found guilty and was sentenced on January 
20, 1984, in the Third District Court, in and for Salt Lake 
County, State of Utah, the Honorable Jay E. Banks, Judge, presiding, 
Statement of Facts 
On April 19, 1983, Officer Steven Brown of Metropolitan 
Narcotics Stike Force, presented certain information to Deputy 
Salt Lake County Attorney McKelvie, who prepared an Affidavit 
for Search Warrant. The affidavit contained a request that the 
officer(s) executing the requested warrant not be required to 
give notice of the officer's authority or purpose (knock and 
announce), on the ground that Officer Brown believed that the 
marijuana and amphetamines thought to be in defendant Danny 
Buck's residence would be easily destroyed. Brown signed the 
affidavit before Circuit Court Judge Eleanor Lewis. Judge Lewis 
then issued the search warrant, but did not authorize the officer 
to dispense with notice of authority and purpose in executing 
the warrant. 
The record is unclear as to whether Officer Brown read 
the warrant after it was issued by Judge Lewis. At the prelimin-
ary hearing held on May 18, 1983, he testified that he had read 
it. He then later testified on July 1, 1983 that he had read 
it, but had not seen that the no-knock authorization had not 
been checked and believed that the warrant was a no-knock warrant 
(Motion to Suppress Transcript, p.100). He then testified on 
December 6, 1983, that he did not remember reading it after it 
was signed by Judge Lewis (Trial Transcript, p.39). 
Thereafter, on April 19, 198 3, Officer Brown, along with 
other Metro officers, all in plain clothes, proceeded to Mr. 
Buck's residence at approximately 5:00 p.m. to execute the search 
warrant. The officers, all bearing visible firearms, spread out 
on both sides of the residence. Officer Brown, without giving 
notice of purpose and authority and without attempting to open 
the door of the residence, kicked it in. Other officers entered 
through the back of the house by kicking in the back door. 
Officer Brown, then inside, began shouting "police officers" 
over and over until all of the officers were inside and they 
Hereafter Motion to Suppress Transcript will be referred 
to as SuT and Trial Transcript as TrT. 
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had checked to see that no one was inside the house. The sub-
sequent search of the house uncovered quantities of marijuana 
and amphetamines. 
At approximately 5:15 p.m., Danny Buck returned to his 
home and was placed under arrest. He was later charged with two 
counts of possession of a controlled substance with intent to 
distribute for value. 
The preliminary hearing was held on this matter on May 18, 
198 3, before Judge Eleanor Lewis, at which time the matter was 
bound over for arraignment. Defendant filed a motion to suppress 
the evidence, which hearing on this motion was held on July 1, 
1983, before Judge Homer F. Wilkinson. No ruling was made at 
this time. At trial, on December 6, 1983, a motion to suppress 
the evidence was again made by the defendant. That motion was 
denied. Defendant was found guilty. • 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
Defendant Danny Duane Buck contends he was denied a 
fair trial when the court failed to grant the motion to suppress 
evidence. He contends that because the search of April 19, 1983 
was conducted in violation of the terms of the search warrant 
itself and in violation of Utah law, it constituted an unreason-
able search, in violation of the Fourth Amendment of the Consti-
tution of the United States. 
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ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
THE SEARCH WARRANT, ON ITS FACE, 
INDICATES THAT JUDGE LEWIS DECIDED 
THAT THE PRESENCE OF NARCOTICS WAS 
NOT BY ITSELF AN EXIGENT CIRCUMSTANCE 
AND ACCORDINGLY, SHE DID NOT AUTHORIZE 
A NO-KNOCK WARRANT, 
Utah Code Ann. §77-23-10 provides that: 
When a search warrant has been issued 
authorizing entry into any building, 
room, conveyance, compartment or other 
enclosure, the officer executing the 
warrant may use such force as is reason-
ably necessary to enter: 
(1) If, after notice of his authority 
and purpose, there is no response or he 
is not admitted with reasonable prompt-
ness; or 
(2) Without notice of his authority and 
purpose, if the magistrate issuing the 
warrant directs in the warrant that the 
officer need not give notice. The magis-
trate shall so direct only upon proof, 
under oath, that the object of the search 
may be quickly destroyed, disposed of, 
or secreted, or that physical harm may 
result to any person if notice were given. 
The most important aspect of the above statute is that 
a magistrate's neutral decision to dispense with notice is 
required before the officer can enter without notice. It has been 
recognized that a "householder is entitled to the assurance that 
the magistrate has considered and decided whether the facts 
justify" a particular kind of search. State v. Dalrymple, 458 
P.2d 96 (New Mexico 1969). Furthermore, the Utah Supreme Court 
recognized the importance of this neutral judgment in State v. 
Spisak, 520 P.2d 561 (Utah 1974), where it upheld the constitu-
tionality of the above statute because it provided for the 
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objective inquiry by the magistrate as to the necessity of 
notice. 
Therefore, becasue this neutral judgment is so very 
important to the constitutionality of the statute, it follows 
that the police are bound to follow it, as set forth in the 
warrant. They are not allowed to exercise their own judgment 
on the same set of facts, and substitute it for the judgment of 
the magistrate. Thus, where Judge Lewis decided, pursuant to 
this law, that the presence of narcotics in Mr. Buck's residence 
did not justify issuing a no-knock warrant, the officers could 
not legally decide otherwise and proceed without knocking in 
contravention of Judge Lewis' directive. 
The State relies on the holding in Ker v. California, 
374 U.S. 23, 10 L.Ed. 2d 726 (1963), where the United States 
Supreme Court upheld the warrantless entry of a residence without 
notice and held that "in the particular circumstances of this case 
the officers method of entry, sanctioned by the law of California, 
was not unreasonable under the standards of the Fourth Amendment 
as applied to the states through the Fourteenth Amendment," at 
28. Obviously, this holding is narrow and the state's reliance 
on it is misplaced for two reasons. 
First of all, the Court in Ker upheld police conduct that 
was legal and routine under the state's laws. California law 
allowed the police to decide, in all narcotics cases, whether 
notice was required before entering a residence; the law vested 
total discretion in the officer. However, that same conduct is 
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illegal under Utah law, as the above statute requires that the 
magistrate make the determination that the presence of narcotics 
in the defendant's residence justifies a no-knock warrant. Thus, 
the Ker reasoning cannot apply where Utah law is so different. 
Also, the circumstances in Ker were different. There 
were "exigent circumstances" justifying an exception to the knock 
and announce rule, i.e., the evidence showed that the defendant 
expected the police to arrive and when they did, he made "furtive 
movements" justifying the police's belief that he might have 
been trying to destroy the narcotics. 
Nothing like that happened in the case at bar. If, when 
the police arrived at Mr. Buck's home, they had heard scuffling 
inside or perhaps the flushing of a toilet, they would have been 
justified, under Ker and Utah law, in entering without notice 
but only because of these circumstances, not solely because they 
knew of the presence of drugs inside. That issue—whether the 
presence of drugs by itself justified entry without notice—had 
already been decided by Judge Lewis in the negative. She there-
fore did not give Officer Brown a no-knock warrant. 
. Therefore, the police were bound to follow the order in 
the warrant and could only have lawfully entered without notice 
if, when they arrived at Danny Buck's residence, circumstances 
then existed that would lead them to believe that Danny Buck 
was going to destroy the evidence. Furthermore, the belief must 
have been reasonable. It must be more than "the mere suspicion, 
intution or 'hunch' of an enforcement officer, upon which a 
-6-
reasonable man could conclude that closed doors are harboring 
clandestine efforts to destroy or conceal evidence." State v. 
Mendoza, 454 P.2d 140 (Arizona 1969), quoting United States v. 
Blank, 251 F.Supp. 166 (D.C. 1970). In Mendoza, a no-knock 
entry was not justified where there was nothing to indicate to 
the officers that the narcotics sought would have been destroyed 
if the officers had announced their presence and purpose. 
Such was the situation in the case at bar. There was 
nothing to indicate to the officers upon their arrival at Danny 
Buck's residence that he was inside trying to destroy the evidence. 
Thusf because the presence of narcotics, by itself, was 
not an exigent circumstance justifying entry without notice, as 
found by Judge Lewis in her authorization of the warrant, and, 
because no additional exigent circumstances existed at Mr. Buck's 
residence to lead the officers to believe that the evidence was 
being destroyed, there was absolutely nothing to justify the 
forceful, unannounced entry into Mr. Buck's residence. It 
was therefore illegal, and the evidence obtained thereby should 
have been suppressed. 
POINT II 
THE LEGAL STANDARDS DEVELOPED UNDER 
THE FOURTH AMENDMENT 
STATES CONSTITUTION 
SUPPRESSION 
OF THE 
SUPPORT 
OF EVIDENCE 
UNITED 
THE 
IN THE CASE 
AT BAR. 
A. THE PROTECTION AFFORDED BY 
THE FOURTH AMENDMENT 
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The Fourth Amendment of the Constitution of the United 
States of America provides that: 
The right of the people to be secure 
in their persons, houses, papers and 
effects, against unreasonable searches 
and seizures shall not be violated, and 
no Warrants shall issue, but upon 
probable cause, supported by Oath or 
affirmation, a particularly describing 
the place to be searched, and the 
persons or things to be seized. 
The adoption of the Fourth Amendment reflected the feeling 
of the Founding Fathers that "the security of one's privacy 
against arbitrary intrusion by the police . . . is basic to a 
free society." Wolf v. Colorado, 388 U.S. 25, 28, 93 L.Ed. 1782 
(1949). The Fourth Amendement protects the citizen from the 
ungoverned discretion of police officers by generally requiring 
a probable cause determination by a magistrate before a search 
can be conducted. It requires that "the deliberate, impartial 
judgment" of this magistrate be "interposed" between law enforce-
ment desires and basic liberty interest of the citizen. Wong Sun 
v. United States, 371 U.S. 471, 481, 9 L.Ed. 2d 441 (1963). In 
doing so, the Fourth Amendment further "denies law enforcement 
the support of the usual inferences which reasonable men draw 
from evidence." Johnson v. United States, 333 U.S. 10, 13, 92 
L.Ed. 436 (1948) . 
Germane to the magistrate's role as a neutral shield 
between the citizen and police is the search warrant. As the 
primary instrument of the magistrate in fulfilling this goal, 
the warrant "is a more reliable safeguard against improper 
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searches than the hurried judgment of a law enforcement officer." 
Id. at 14. 
As the search warrant is a preferred weapon for protect-
ing Fourth Amendment rights, it is of utmost importance that the 
courts remember that the "mandate of the Fourth Amendment requires 
adherence to judicial process," United States v. Jeffers, 342 U.S. 
48, 51, 96 L.Ed. 59 (1951), and that it "confines the officer 
executing a search warrant strictly within the bounds set by 
the warrant." Bivens v. Six Unknonwn Named Agents, 403 U.S. 
388, 394 ftnt 7, 29 L.Ed. 2d 619 (1971). The courts must require 
adherence to the warrants commands and limitations in order to 
protect Fourth Amendment rights, lest they not be "revocable at 
the whim of any police officer who, in the name of law enforcement 
itself, chooses to suspend [their] enjoyment." Mapp v. Ohio, 367 
U.S. 643, 660 6 L.Ed. 2d 108 (1961). 
Indeed, it was the abuse of the warrant in common law 
England which eventually led to the adoption of the Fourth Amend-
ment in the United States, which, "together with legislation regu-
lating the process, should be liberally construed in favor of the 
individual." Sgro v. United States, 287 U.S. 206, 210, 77 L.Ed. 
260 (1932) . Thus, especially where Fourth Amendment protections 
are implemented by statutory law as well as by the specific 
directive in a search warrant, the courts should always require 
compliance with the law and the bounds set by the warrant. To 
permit the executing officer to exceed those bounds would eviscer-
ate the Fourth Amendment's requirement of authorization "by a 
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warrant issued by a neutral judicial officer." Katz v. United 
States, 389 U.S. 347, 354, 19 L.Ed. 2d 576 (1967). Then the 
requirement of a warrant would be reduced to a meaningless for-
mality and Fourth Amendment protections reduced to nullity. 
B. THE POLICY REASONS BEHIND THE 
FOURTH AMENDMENT'S KNOCK AND 
ANNOUNCE RULE WERE VIOLATED BY 
THE UNANNOUNCED POLICE ENTRY 
IN THIS CASE. 
The policy reason's behind the Knock and Announce Rule 
were discussed by the United States Supreme Court in Ker v. 
California, 374 U.S. 23, 10 L.Ed. 2d 726 (1963). They are to 
protect the citizen in the peaceful security of his home and to 
protect those who might be injured if violence occurs due to 
unannounced entries. 
The officers in this situation entered the defendant's 
home without knocking or announcing their presence when they 
had no knowledge as to whether anyone was inside. This conduct 
violated the purposes behind the rule. It is irrelevant that 
no one was inside, because the officers did not know that. Hind-
sight cannot now be used to justify actions which could just as 
easily violated the security of defendant's home and more 
importantly, instigated violent resistance to the forced entry. 
The practicality of this latter concern is evident, "for 
if no previous demand is made, how is it possible for a party to 
know what the object of the person breaking down the door may 
be? He has a right to consider it as an aggression on his private 
property, which he will be justified in resisting to the utmost." 
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Launock v. Brown, 2 B & Aid. 592, 594, 106 Eng.Rep. 482, 483 
(1819). The potential for this very sort of violent response 
existed here, especially where the police were not in uniform 
and surrounded the house, all bearing visible firearms (TrT. 
p.42). Furthermore, Officer Brown just kicked the door in with-
out even first checking to see if it would open on its own (TrT. 
p. 43), thereby damaging defendant's property without knowing the 
necessity thereof. It was only then that the officers, guns 
drawn, ran through the house, repeatedly shouting "police" (TrT. 
p.44). By then, it is likely that any citizen would have already 
suffered the shock and fear of having his home surrounded by 
plainly-clothed men with guns, one of whom willfully damages his 
property. At this point, any normal citizen might have been 
induced to respond violently. This is exactly the kind of situ-
ation which has been repeatedly condemned since the "knock and 
announce" rule had its origins in common law England. And 
although no violence was done here, to support the actions of 
these police officers could encourage such behavior in the future, 
increasing the probability for violence. 
Moreover, the conduct of the police officers in this 
instance did not fall within the "exigent circumstances" exception 
to the knock and announce rule, discussed in Ker v. California, 
374 U.S. 23 (1963) . In K_er, the police were not required to 
knock and announce their presence where the evidence showed that 
the defendant was expecting the police and knew of their purpose. 
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More importantly, the defendant's furtive movements inside the 
house justified the officer's belief that he might have been 
trying to destroy the evidence—a factor which the court recog-
nized as excusing compliance with the rule. In the case at bar, 
Officer Brown had no reason to think that the defendant was 
trying to escape or destroy evidence. He did not see or hear 
any furtive movement inside. Therefore, he had no reason to 
kick in the door and his action in doing so was not only need-
lessly aggressive, but illegal. 
C. THE RECENT DECISIONS OF THE 
UNITED STATES SUPREME COURT 
SUPPORT DEFENDANT'S POSITION. 
In United States v. Leon, 468 U.S. 82 L.Ed. 2d 677, 
104 S.Ct. (1984) , the United States Supreme Court held that 
evidence obtained by officers acting in reasonable reliance on a 
search warrant issued by a neutral magistrate, but utlimately 
found to be without probable cause, was not to be suppressed. 
In doing so, the Court effectively created a good faith exception 
to the exclusionary rule where the police activity in question 
was objectively reasonable, i.e., there, where the officer asked 
pursuant to the terms of a warrant that he thought was lawful and 
valid. 
The Court based its decision largely on the purpose of the 
exclusionary rule defined as, "a judicially created remedy designed 
to safeguard Fourth Amendment rights generally through its deter-
ent effect," Id. at 687, quoting United States v.Calandra, 414 
U.S. 338 (1974) at 348. It then reviewed many of its exclusionary 
-12-
rule decisions, reflecting the concern that the rule should not 
always be applied to Fourth Amendment violations, especially 
where the deterrence of unlawful police conduct would not be 
accomplished. 
Turning to the facts before it, the Court reasoned that 
because police cannot be expected to question the magistrate^ 
probable cause determination or judgment that the form of the 
warrant is legally sufficient, to exclude evidence because the 
officer accepted such mistaken judgment but made no error on his 
own, would not, "logically contribute to the deterrence of Fourth 
Amendment violations." Id., at 697. The Court noted that the 
deterrence goal would especially not be fulfilled when an officer 
has obtained a search warrant from a judge or magistrate and 
"acted within its scope." Id., at 697. It rejected the argument 
that suppression will encourage officers to scrutinze warrants for 
technical errors, still expressly assuming that the officers 
properly executed the warrant. 
As the Court's decision creating this good faith exception 
to the exclusionary rule turns on the officers compliance with 
the warrants directives, the exception is clearly inapplicable 
to the present case. Here the officer either read and ignored, 
or did not read the warrant, and went ahead to execute it improp-
erly exceeding the authorization contained therein and violating 
the Utah no-knock statute. 
Furthermore, because the officers1 activities exceeded 
the scope of the warrant and violated the State statute, the 
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deterrence factor is very strong here. Application of the 
exclusionary rule would undoubtedly result in a change of un-
desirable police behavior; most officers hereforth will read 
the warrants under which they act and will be certain of the 
limitations imposed upon them. The purpose of the warrant is 
to limit the police discretion. To allow the evidence seized 
to be admitted would not only undermine the purpose of the 
Utah statute, but would encourage police violations such as 
this, rendering the warrant requirement meaningless. 
Therefore, under the reasoning set forth in United States 
v. Leon, the evidence seized by police acting outside the scope 
of the warrant should be suppressed* 
This conclusion is further supported by the Supreme 
Court's decision in Massachusetts v* Sheppard,468 U.S. , 82 
L.Ed. 2d 737 (1984) , which applied the standards set forth in the 
Leon case. 
There, a police officer requested a particular search 
warrant. Upon delivery of the warrant, the judge assured the 
officer that the warrant authorized the requested search. It 
was later discovered that the judge had not issued the warrant 
in the proper form. A motion to suppress evidence obtained 
thereunder was denied. The Supreme Court affirmed, concluding 
that the officers belief in the warrants validity rested on the 
judge's assurance and was, therefore, objectively reasonable and 
in good faith. Id. at 744. 
The Court based its decision on the objective belief 
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standard set forth in the Leon case in ruling that an officer 
is not required to disbelieve a judge who has just advised him 
that the warrant he possesses authorizes him to conduct the 
search he has requested. The Court also noted that it was the 
judge, not the officer who committed the error, suggesting the 
inappropriateness of applying the exclusionary rule in such a 
situation. Id., at 745. 
The case at bar is clearly distinguishable from the 
situation in Sheppard. Judge Lewis made no assurances to 
Officer Brown regarding his request for a no-knock warrant. She 
did not verbally authorize it, nor did her conduct suggest that 
she intended to authorize it. Therefore, there was nothing for 
him to reasonably and in good faith rely on outside of the express 
terms of the warrant itself. 
This is not a situation where the exclusionary rule would 
be applied to punish the error of a judge. The Judge did not err. 
Further, to apply the exclusionary rule in this case would not 
be a signal to police officers to question whether a magistrate 
has in fact authorized a particular search—it would be a signal 
to police officers that knowledge of and compliance with the terms 
of a search warrant is required by the Fourth Amendment. 
POINT III 
PURSUANT TO UTAH CODE ANN. §77-35-12, 
THE EVIDENCE SHOULD HAVE BEEN SUPPRESS-
ED, AS THE FOURTH AMENDMENT VIOLATION 
INVOLVED IN THIS CASE WAS BOTH SUBSTAN-
TIAL AND NOT IN GOOD FAITH. 
Utah Code Ann. §77-35-12 (g) provides, in part, that: 
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(1) In any motion concerning the admissi-
bility of evidence or the suppression 
of evidence pursuant to this section or 
at trial, upon grounds of unlawful search 
and seizure, the suppression of evidence 
shall not be granted unless the court 
finds the violation upon which it is 
based to be both a substantial violation 
and not committed in good faith. The 
court shall set forth its reasons for 
such finding. 
(2) An unlawful search or seizure shall 
in all cases be deemed substantial if 
one or more of the following is establish-
ed by the defendant or applicant by a 
preponderance of the evidence: 
(i) The violation was grossly negli-
gent , willful, malicious, shocking to 
to the conscience of the court or was 
a result of the practice of the law 
enforcement agency pursuant to a 
general order of that agency; 
(ii) The violation was intended only 
to harass without legitmate law enforce-
ment purposes. 
Subsection 2 sets forth two situations in which the viola-
tion will always be considered substantial. Defendant contends 
that the violation here was the result of at least gross negligence 
on the part of the officer in failing to read, or, disregarding 
the terms of the search warrant. There is no better example 
of gross negligence than failing to obey a duty imposed by law, 
where the person owing the duty is a public officer and the duty 
involves the public peace. Furthermore, not only did the officer 
fail to obey the lawful order of a court of law, but in doing so 
he also violated a State statute. 
Even were the court to rule that the officer's failure 
to obey the warrant was not grossly negligent and thus substantial 
under Utah Code Ann. §77-35-12 (g) (2), the court may still find 
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that the violation was substantial for other reasons. The 
instances of substantiality listed under Utah Code Ann. §77-35-12 
(g)(2) are not exclusive. Indeed, other jurisdictions have 
found similar actions of police officers to constitute sub-
stantial Fourth Amendment violations and have applied the 
exclusionary rule accordingly. 
In State v. Dalrymple, 458 P.2d 96 (New Mexico 1969), the 
Court of Appeals of New Mexico reversed the defendant's conviction, 
holding that where nighttime searches were not authorized by 
appropriate direction on the warrants, the searches executed under 
the warrants were unreasonable and illegal and that evidence 
seized thereunder should have been suppressed. 
There the state statute provided that night searches 
could only be conducted where the magistrate determined the 
necessity thereof and authorized such on the warrant itself, 
similar to the Utah no-knock statute. The court rejected the 
state's argument that because the affidavits upon which the 
warrants were issed were sufficient to authorize a search any-
time, the police had substantially complied with the statute, 
stating that, "[T]he difficulty with this argument is that it 
ignores the plain requirement of the statute that the issuing 
magistrate or judge shall make an affirmative determination as 
to whether the warrant may be executed other than in the daytime." 
Id. at 98. The court emphasized the mandatory nature of the 
statute (as opposed to the validity of the warrant itself), 
suggesting that a violation of it would be substantial. 
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The situation is the same in the present case. The 
circumstances surrounding the issuance of the warrant may have 
justified a no-knock search, but that determination was not 
made by Judge Lewis as required by the Utah statute. The Court 
cannot ignore the plain requirment of the statute, especially 
where the Court has held that it is this requirement (the neutral 
determination of a magistrate) which makes the Utah no-knock 
statute constitutional. State v. Spisak, 520 P.2d 561 (Utah 
1974). Therefore, the violation of such a significant require-
ment alone is substantial. So, too, is the attendant violation 
of the court order given pursuant to that requirement. 
In another case, Wilkins v. State, 547 S.W.2d 1116 (Ark. 
1977), the Arkansas Supreme Court recognized the substantiality 
of such a violation, holding that suppression was proper where 
a nighttime search was not authorized on the warrant. The court 
stated that the "search was in clear contravention to the direc-
tive of the issuing magistrate, and consequently, all of the 
property seized thereunder must be suppressed." 3jd. at 117. 
Also, in State v. Thompson, 464 A.2d 799 (Conn. 1983), 
the Connecticut Supreme Court upheld the dismissal of conspiracy 
to possess and distrubute narcotics charges on the grounds that 
the police had violated the minimization requirement of the 
Connecticut wiretap statute and the court order which had been 
issued purusant to that staute. As officers had misconstrued 
the scope of the order which authorized the wiretap and then dis-
regarded it, the court stated that therefore, "the otherwise 
valid warrant [became] a general one in which case the fruits of 
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the search must be suppressed." Id., at 813. In response to 
the state's argument that only the evidence obtained as a 
result of the minimization requirement should be suppressed, 
the Court answered that had the officers at least attempted to 
comply with the statute and the warrant issued thereunder, that 
might be proper, but that it should uphold "total suppression 
when the violation results from complete disregard of the mini-
mization requirement." Id. at 812. This was so because "[t]o 
permit the executing officer to exceed those bounds would 
eviscerate the Fourth Amendment's requirements that electronic 
surveillance be authorized by a warrant issued by a neutral 
judicial officer." Id. at 810, quoting Katz v. United States, 
389 U.S. 347, 354 (1967) . 
The court's main concern was to ensure the integrity 
of the statute and the judiciary function with respect to it. 
Similarly, to allow the officers actions in the case at bar to 
stand would impair the integrity of the Utah no-knock statute, 
especially where, as noted before, the judicial determination 
requirement saves the statute from constitutional infirmity. 
Such a ruling would render the judge's duties under the statute 
meaningless. Based on the foregoing, the Court should thus rule 
that the police conduct in the present case constituted a sub-
stantial Fourth Amendment violation. 
Utah law then provides that if the defendant establishes 
that the search or seizure was unlawful and substantial by a 
preponderance of the evidence, the peace officer must then, 
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by a preponderance of the evidence, prove the good faith actions 
of the police officer. Pursuant to the standards set forth in 
the recent United States Supreme Court decisions, United States v. 
Leon, 468 U.S. , 82 LEd. 2d 677 (1984) and Massachusetts v. 
Sheppard, 468 U.S. , 82 L.Ed. 2d 737 (1984), other principles 
of law, and the factors set forth in Utah Code Ann. §77-35-12 (g) (3), 
the officers actions in the present case were not in good faith. 
Utah Code Ann. §77-35-12 (g) (3) provides, in part, that: 
In determining whether a peace officer 
was acting in good faith under this 
section, the court shall consider, in 
addition to any other relevant factors, 
some or all of the following: 
(i) The extent of deviation from 
legal search and seizure standards; 
(ii) The extent to which exclusion 
will tend to deter future violations 
of search and seizure standards; 
(iii) Whether or not the officer was 
proceeding by way of a search warrant, 
arrest warrctnt, or relying on previ-
ous specific directions of a magis-
trate or prosecutor. . . 
The United States Supreme Court, in United States v. Leon, 
468 U.S. , 82 L.Ed. 2d 677 (1984) and Massachusetts v. 
Sheppard, 468 U.S. , 82 L.Ed. 2d 737 (1984), effectively 
carved out a good faith exception to the exclusionary rule. As 
discussed previously in this brief at page 14, Massachusetts v. 
Sheppard, applying the principles set forth United States v. Leon, 
held that where an officer acts in reasonable reliance on a 
magistrate's express assurance that the search warrant authorizes 
the search requested by the officer, evidence obtained in reliance 
on that assurance will not be suppressed. The Court concluded 
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that the officers actions were in good faith where the officer's 
belief in the authority of the warrant rested on the judge's 
assurance, reasoning that an officer should not be required to 
disbelieve a judge who tells him that the warrant authorizes 
the requested search. 
The situation in the present case is not the same. Here, 
the officer was given no assurances. There was nothing for him 
to, in good faith, rely upon except the express terms of the 
warrant itself, which he did not follow. Judge Lewis never 
verbally authorized the requested search and never assured the 
officer that she was going to authorize the requested search. 
Therefore, his belief in the warrants authority was not objectively 
reasonable and in good faith as defined by the Supreme Court in 
Sheppard. 
Furthermore, the facts set forth by the Utah Legislature 
in Utah Code Ann. §77-35-12 (g) (3) support a finding that the 
officers were not acting in good faith. 
(i) The extent of deviation from legal 
search and seizure standards. 
As mentioned and cited before, other states have ruled 
on the issue of whether officers acting outside the limitations 
set forth in a warrant are in violation of legal search and 
seizure standards. Most states have held that they are. See 
State v. Dalrymple, 458 P.2d 96 (1969) (officers nighttime execu-
tion of a warrant that did not contain the nighttime search author-
ization was held to be illegal and thus, the evidence seized 
under the warrant was suppressed); State v. Wilson, 540 P.2d 1269 
-21-
(Arizona 1975)(nighttime search was illegal where it had not 
been authorized in the warrant); Wilkens v. State, 547 S.W.2d 
1116 (Arkansas 1977) (nighttime search was illegcil where it was 
not authorized in the warrant); State v. Thompson, 464 A.2d 799 
(Conn. 1983)(wiretap was illegal where it exceeded the minimiza-
tion limitations set forth in the court order). 
(ii) The extent to which exclusion 
will tend to deter future 
violations of search and 
seizure standards. 
The strength of the deterrence factor in a situation 
where officers acted outside the scope of a wiretap warrant was 
recognized by the Connecticut Supreme Court in State v. Thompson, 
supra, where the court noted that one of the reasons for uphold-
ing the suppression of evidence there was to recognize "the need 
for any effective deterrent to unlawful conduct of wiretaps/1 
464 A.2d at 812. 
In that kind of situation, similar to the case at bar, 
a neutral judge or magistrate has examined the facts and set 
forth specific commands and limitations in a search warrant. 
The executing officer then oversteps the limitations contained 
in the warrant, so the violation results from his error. In 
this situation, the suppression of evidence effects the source 
of the Fourth Amendment violation and is therefore a more 
effective deterrent. 
Likewise, as noted by the United States Supreme Court 
in United States v. Leon, supra, suppression will not have any 
deterrent effect on police behavior in cases where the officer 
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reasonably relied on a magistrate's determination which later 
turns out to be wrong. 82 L.Ed, 2d at 697. The court noted that 
the deterrence goal would especially not be fulfilled where the 
officer has obtained a search warrant and "acted within its 
scope." Id, Again, the logical correllary to this is that 
suppression will have a deterrent effect where the officer has 
not acted within the scope of the warrant—where it is the officer 
and not the judge who has erred. 
Such is the case here. At the very least, suppression 
of evidence obtained in violation of a warrant's limitations 
will encourage officers to read, ascertain, and follow the 
directives in the warrant. 
(iii) Whether or not the officer was 
proceeding by way of a search 
warrant, arrest warrant, or 
relying on the previous specific 
directions of a magistrate or 
prosecutor. 
Consideration of this factor supports defendant's conten- -
tion that the officer was not acting in good faith. Here, the 
officer was not proceeding by way of a search warrant, because 
he proceeded beyond the way of such warrant. Nor was he relying 
on the previous directions of a magistrate when in fact he failed 
to obey those directions. Because of this, the State cannot now 
rely on the fact that a warrant was issued. 
In State v. Merjil, 655 P.2d 864 (Hawaii 1982), the 
Hawaii Supreme Court reversed the defendant's conviction where 
the magistrate's order, which allowed a body cavity search to be 
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given only if an X-ray was given first and revealed the presence 
of foreign matter in the body, was not followed. The Court 
held that "where the warrant sets out a procedure by which to 
conduct the search, the government must reasonably adhere to 
that procedure. The procedure was not followed here, so the 
government may not rely on the court order to justify the search." 
Id. at 865. The court recognized the uselessness of allowing 
the government to argue that the actions of its officers were 
in good faith, simply because the officers had obtained a warrant, 
in situations where the officers acted in excess of the authority 
contained in the warrant. To allow the officers to stand behind 
a warrant which they did not follow would be to make a mockery of 
the warrant requirement. In the case at bar, the court should not 
allow the State to assert that the existance of the warrant itself 
indicates good faith on the part of the officers. The fact that 
it was not adhered to indicates a lack of good faith. 
Therefore, the officers in the case at bar were not acting 
in good faith, as defined by the United States Supreme Court in 
Massachusetts v. Sheppard, supra, and considering the factors set 
forth in Utah Code Ann. §77-35-12 (g) (3). Consequently, the 
motion to suppress should have been granted pursuant to Utah 
Code Ann. §77-35-12 (g). 
POINT IV 
THE STATES ARGUMENT THAT BECAUSE, AFTER 
THE OFFICERS HAD KNOCKED AND GOTTEN NO 
RESPONSE, THEIR ENTRY WOULD HAVE BEEN 
LAWFUL UNDER UTAH CODE ANN. §77-23-10; 
THAT IT WAS LAWFUL HERE WHEN THEY DID 
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NOT KNOCK, IGNORES THE PURPOSE AND 
PLAIN MEANING OF UTAH CODE ANN. 
§77-23-10. 
Utah Code Ann. §77-23-10 provides that: 
When a search warrant has been issued 
authorizing entry into any building, 
room, conveyance, compartment, or 
other enclosure, the officer executing 
the warrant may use such force as is 
reasonably necessary to enter: 
(1) If, after notice of his authority 
and purpose, there is no response or 
he is not admitted with reasonable 
promptness; or 
(2) Without notice of his authority 
and purpose, if the magistrate issuing 
the warrant directs in the warrant that 
the officer need not give notice. The 
magistrate shall so direct only upon 
proof, under oath, that the object of 
the search may be quickly destroyed, 
disposed of, or secreted, or that 
physical harm may result to any person 
if notice were given. 
The above statute sets out the only two, separate situ-
ations in which an officer may use forces to enter a dwelling. 
He may forcefully enter a building when there is no response from 
within—only if he has given notice first. Or, he may force-
fully enter without notice where the warrant authorizes him 
to do so. These are separate statutory sections and the plain 
meaning of them is that the officer may act under one or the other. 
In the present case, the officer did not knock first, justifying 
a forced entry under subsection (1). Also, the warrant did not 
authorize a surprise, forced entry under subsection (2). There-
fore the forced entry was not made in compliance with the statue 
and was thus, illegal. 
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The officers are responsible for following the required 
procedures on execution of any search warrant. A simple reading 
of the warrant would have revealed lack of permission to enter 
as they did. Even if that reading had been done after leaving 
.the magistrate and still before entry, officers certainly could 
have recontacted the judge by telephone for clarification. If 
the judge chose to allow "no-knock" entry a new correct search 
warrant could have been drafted by telephone as provided by 
Utah statute with very little lost by the officers. Certainly 
a small amount of double checking the work and correcting of 
mistakes is not too much to require before invading the most 
intimate privacy of a citizen's home. 
The State seeks to apply a hindsight constriction, 
mixing and matching the words of the separate statutory sections 
in order to justify illegal police conduct. This argument has 
no place in this discussion, where the issue is simply that the 
police did not obey this law. Under no convoluted construction 
can it be said that they did what this statute plainly requires. 
The statute clearly sets up a code of conduct to be 
followed by police officers. The court should support the legis-
lative determination of how its officers should conduct themselves 
in searches. To accept the States ever-present and tedious "no 
harm done" argument suggests that the State can break the law in 
its superior position as crime fighter. This kind of thinking 
threatens the integrity of laws enacted to protect the individual, 
laws such as this which provide for neutral judgment to be 
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interposed between police discretion and the citizen's liberty. 
This Court in State v. Spisak, 520 P.2d 561 (Utah 1974), 
recognized the constitutional importance of the requirement of 
subsection (2) (that a magistrate determine whether the facts 
justify a no-knock warrant), which gives the statute and the 
orders issued under it their validity. It would be analogous 
for the court to now allow conduct which circumvents this 
important safeguard to stand. Again, the statute's mandate was 
not followed, under either section. The State's argument ignores 
the law. In order to maintain the respect and integrity of the 
law, the State's argument should be rejected. 
CONCLUSION 
Put very simply, a search warrant was issued by an 
independent magistrate. No permission was given by the magis-
trate to the police to enter the premises without knocking. 
The police totally ignored the issue of whether or not they 
had such permission even though getting such permission is one 
of the few specific requirements of the law in Utah regarding 
search warrants. Such disregard for procedure is a gross devia-
tion from the law on search warrants. The only remedy is suppres-
sion of evidence gained by illegal means. The trial court erred 
when it should have suppressed the evidence seized and did not. 
Defendant/appellant respectfully requests that this Court rule 
now to correct that error. 
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